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It’s better than stealing: informal street selling in Brussels 
Introduction 
Notwithstanding the differing scale of street selling between countries and cities (Bhowmik, 2005), 
this ancient activity is considered to be ubiquitous (Bromley, 2000) and increasing. The latter fact is 
tied to changes in the global economy associated with post-modernity (Cross, 2000). Accordingly, 
street vending, as an urban income-generating activity, has been studied in many settings. However, 
most empirical studies published in English focus on street trade in developing countries (e.g., 
Bhowmik, 2005, 2010), Middle and Latin American countries (e.g., Coletto, 2010; Cross, 1998; 
Cutsinger, 2000; Harrison and McVey, 1997; Middleton, 2003) and southern European countries 
(e.g., Antonopoulos et al., 2011; Bellinvia, 2013; Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2003; Nelken, 2006). 
Given that Western societies have also experienced more contractual and short-term employment, 
higher levels of unemployment and a decrease of expenditure on metropolitan administration and 
welfare services, urban areas in these societies are deemed to be informalised (Williams and 
Windebank, 2001). We thus see no reason why street selling would not occur in these societies, 
which implies the need to fill this gap in the literature by studying the topic in such areas.  
Albeit street selling can take place in a purely formal manner (Bromley, 2000), some studies have 
been executed within the topic of the informal economy (Coletto, 2010; Cross, 2000), on the 
assumption that street selling is one of the most visible manifestations of the informal economy 
(Thomas, 1992 as cited by de Bruin and Dupuis, 2000). Such studies have highlighted the 
fragmentation and heterogeneity of informal selling in terms of organisation (sellers and the trade), 
working conditions, motives (Bromley, 2000; Coletto, 2010), degree of legality of the occupation of 
public spaces, labour relations (Coletto, 2013) and (evolution of) regulatory mechanisms (Bellinvia, 
2013; Coletto, 2010; Morales, 2000; Smart, 1986). Interestingly, certain studies tend to focus on 
specific types of sellers, such as Nigerian disc-sellers (Antonopoulos et al., 2011) or immigrant beach 
sellers (Nelken, 2006), whereas others (in the domain of economics, sociology of work and 
marketing) focus on geographically limited spaces (e.g. de Bruin and Dupuis, 2000; Witkowski, 1993).  
Considering street selling as a form of informal economy should not imply adopting a dualistic point 
of view, in which the formal economy is seen as unrelated to the informal economy (Chen, 2004). 
Indeed, many researchers have contested the usefulness and empirical tenability of a dual point of 
departure (Alderslade et al., 2006; Boels, 2013; de Bruin and Dupuis, 2000; Coletto, 2010; Cross, 
2000; Verhage and Shapland, 2013). Notwithstanding the main focus of this article is informal street 
selling and its participants, we equally endorse this lack of a clear distinction between the formal, 
informal and illegal/criminal economy, partly on the basis of our empirical results which confirm the 
fluidity of the informal economy (Cross, 2000: p. 33). In this article, we define the informal economy 
as those parts of the economy that are not officially regulated, enforced and/or registered 
(Adriaenssens et al, 2009). Rather than simply contributing to the debate on the informal economy, 
we fill a gap in the existing empirical literature on street selling by focusing on a North European 
country and the informal economy by executing qualitative research in a neglected field of study. In 
line with de Bruin and Dupuis (2000), Smart (1986) and Witkowski (1993) we focus on two formal 
open - air markets (one private and one public) and the surrounding sales venues. The focus on 
informal street selling in a specific area of Brussels, where both formal and informal street selling 
take place and have not been studied before, enables us to study the interrelated types of selling. 
This approach equally enables us to move beyond the study of a specific type of seller in terms of 
both nationality/origin and sold goods to generate a broader empirical framework. We focus on two 
main levels: (1) the activity and (2) the workers. We identify the types of informal street selling 
within the geographical boundaries of the case, but, more importantly, we identify and elaborate on 
the decisions of sellers with regard to their entry into the business, the organisation of their work 
and their own perceptions of their activities. In this respect, we identify the viewpoint of informal 
workers, without whom the informal economy would not exist.  
The selected area, referred to as Brussels South, is geographically located in two municipalities near 
the Brussels South railway station (Anderlecht and Sint-Gillis). The complexity of the Belgian 
government is disproportionate to the country’s size and thus requires some explanation. Since 
1970, Belgium, which is a federalist country, has five levels of governance: (1) federal, (2)  
community, (3) region, (4) province and (5) municipality. This structure implies that whereas policy 
areas are regulated in general at the federal level (e.g., migration, justice, labour regulation), other 
related topics (or subtopics) are regulated at the level of the community (e.g. integration of migrants) 
or the region (e.g. employment mediation)i. As illustrated with regard to migration by van Meeteren 
et al. (2008), this can lead to paradoxical situations in which the federal government forbids certain 
migrants from staying legally in the country, whereas the Flemish government offers support to 
migrants for illegal stay. The region of Brussels comprises 19 municipalities. Although we refer to 
Brussels, our case study is not geographically located in the capital of the country, but in two 
adjacent municipalities, infamous for their flourishing informal street trade (which is the reason we 
selected them). Furthermore, these municipalities are characterised by multiculturalism and socio-
economic deprivation.  
Street sellingii is not defined in Belgian law but would fit under the category of ambulatory tradeiii, 
which is defined by law as the sale, the offer of sale or the display (in order to sell) of products and 
services related to these products.iv In contradiction to Bhowmik (2005) but in line with Coletto 
(2013), we suggest that street selling is not purely self-employed labour. In short, according to the 
federal regulation on ambulatory activities, formal selling can be executed in public markets, private 
markets and public spaces such as roads, places adjacent to public roads and commercial parking lots 
insofar as the organisation of these activities has been approved by the host municipality. 
Furthermore, sellers need authorisation for ambulatory trade granted by services of the Crossroad 
Banks of Enterprises.v The practical organisation of ambulatory trade is regulated by the municipality 
or the private organiser (in the case of a private market), albeit taking the federal regulations into 
account.  
Methods 
In order to grasp the diversity of street selling in the case and to understand the choices of people 
involved, interviews and observations were the main methods used (Beyens and Tournel, 2010; 
Boeije, 2005) (see Table 1). Sellers were not only approached during their selling activities but were 
also contacted through intermediate organisations and snowball sampling (Atkinson and Flint, 2001; 
Kleemans et al., 2008). Dutch, French and English were the languages in which these interviews took 
place. Approximately 50 hours of observations were carried out, dispersed over different days and 
hours in order to provide a broad view on the setting (Coletto, 2013). Additionally, documentary 
analyses served to identify the policy (Vervaecke et al., 2002), which we see as a combination of 
regulation and enforcement (cf. Cross, 2000).vi These methods are in line with previous research on 
informal street selling (e.g., Antonopoulos et al., 2011; Bellinvia, 2013; de Bruin and Dupuis, 2000). 
Owing to the sampling strategies and the limited number of interviews, the results cannot be taken 
as representative of the sector, but this does not diminish the value of the explorative research, 
especially given the validation of the interview results by observation (van Meeteren et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, since several typesvii of sellers were interviewed, the sector was covered to a large 
extent.  
Table 1. Overview of the interviews 
 N recorded  N non-recorded N respondents Interview length 
Street vendors (SV)
viii
 11 6 18 30 min – 1.5 h 
Regulators (ER) 2 0 3 1 – 2.5 h 
Enforcers (EE) 11 3 16 1 – 2.5 h 
Intermediates (EI) 7 1 8 1 – 2.5 h 
Total 31 10 45  
 
The markets and their surroundings 
The neighbourhood hosting the private marketix is often portrayed as a dangerous area inspiring fear 
and feelings of insecurity (De Caluwé, 2012). The near surroundings of the market, however, radiate 
a lively, animated and multicultural atmosphere (owing to the crowd of people dragging shopping 
trolleys or carrying bags, traffic jamming the streets and acquaintances greeting each other) than 
feelings of insecurity. The market is organised each Friday, Saturday and Sunday, attracting up to 650 
traders (mostly with North African and Pakistani roots) and 100,000 visitors and/or clients during 
weekends (De Caluwé, 2012). On Fridays and on weekend mornings one can walk in the market and 
look at the merchandise without being crowded. From approximately 11:00 to 11:30 on Sundays, 
however, the market gets very crowded (under good weather conditions): it is constantly jammed; 
shopping trolleys and people bump into each other; clients check out the merchandise, talk to 
family/friends about it; clients and sellers are actively involved in bargaining; and sellers loudly praise 
their goods. Nearly all imaginable goods (e.g., food, clothing, furniture) are provisioned at low prices, 
mainly attracting a range of poorer clients. At the main entrance to the market, people group 
together around the shops (e.g., the Polish butcher's) and pavement cafés. Talking, drinking, 
laughing, selling and buying are their main activities. The street opposite the main entrance is known 
for its flourishing car trade (import-export companies), mainly run by Africans. At the top of this 
street are some cafés and small shops that exhibit their merchandise on the pavement. Further down 
cars pass slowly and groups of men talk, observe, laugh, shout, negotiate and sell on the pavements.  
Fewer than two kilometres away, the public market is open each Sunday from 08:00 to 13:00. 
Walking out of the railway station, one comes across stands of textiles (mostly sold by Pakistanis), 
beauty products and biscuits. A little further down the street along the railway tracks, there are four 
rows of stands with diverse goods such as flowers, handbags, linen, underwear and shoes. The 
market extends to the north-east, where three more rows of stands exhibit different goods such as 
textiles, toys, shoes, olives, bread, pastries and exotic spices. The fruit and vegetable stalls are mainly 
concentrated on the other side of the railway tracks.  
More insights into the nature of informal street selling 
Informal street selling not only takes place within the area of the formal markets but also outside 
them. In regard to links with the formal markets, two types of informality are discernible: (1) informal 
selling in the formal markets and (2) informal selling outside the market domain, but during market 
hours. The ‘independent’ informal street trade takes place on the street, but also in cafés.  
Informality within formal markets 
Four subtypes are discernible of which illegal (and thus non-declared) employment is the first. This 
can take two main forms: (1) employment of people permitted to reside legally in the country but 
not permitted to workx or (2) employment of people not authorised to stay (and thus) work in 
Belgium. Different tasks, reflecting different degrees of responsibility, are performed ranging from 
getting a coffee for an employer to helping with the supply of the stands and selling the 
merchandise. The smaller jobs done by migrants, who offer their services here and there during the 
setting-up of the market, are usually not performed on a regular basis and do not offer a fixed 
‘salary’. Sale of merchandise by illegal migrants takes place on a regular basis.  
Second, undeclared labour by employees authorised to stay and work in the country is assumed to 
occur by some respondents.  For example, a regulator states: 
‘I think that is the order of the day. Especially here, the foreigners, they always have an 
uncle, a brother, a cousin who coincidentally came along to help. So these men, they are 
not declared. Because in some stalls there are five, six persons. If he has to declare and 
pay for all of them, that can’t be profitable’. (ER1) 
Sometimes, these employees receive social benefits, thus committing social benefit fraud. However, 
not only employees fail to declare their activities. According to an enforcer, stallholders are equally 
guilty of social fraud since they sometimes make use of forged authorisations.  
Third, sellers without authorisation for ambulatory trade infiltrate the markets and blend in with the 
formal sellers. Two subtypes are present: (1) people walking around the market trying to sell goods 
(e.g., smartphones, watches, phone cards, bread, toys) and (2) people who adopt more or less fixed 
places between the established, formal stands. The former occur in both markets, whereas the latter 
mostly occur in the public market. Between the formal stands of the public market informal sellers 
display counterfeit perfumes, clothing and sunglasses on the ground. Although their exact position 
might change from week to week, they always settle in the same row. Selling techniques vary from 
showing the merchandise (subtype 1) to loudly praising the reasonable price of the perfumes 
(subtype 2).  
Lastly, counterfeit goods are sold in some formal stalls in the private market. Popular items are 
handbags (Gucci, Vuitton, Prada), Burberry watches, clothing (hats, t-shirts) and beauty products.  
Informality outside the private market 
In addition to bread and telephone cards, counterfeit goods (e.g., Vuitton handbags and wallets, 
Guess T-shirts, Dior perfumes) are sold outside the side entrance. It is notable that the sellers are not 
active on Sundays because of the presence of police regulating the traffic. This is deemed necessary 
given the huge amount of visitors attracted by the market on Sundays. Although the police are there 
to regulate the traffic instead of controlling sellers, the latter do not perform their informal activities 
right in front of the police. On Fridays and Saturdays, the sellers risk patrols, which is why all sellers 
keep an eye out for potential enforcers. Our interviews suggest that the seller who first sees an 
enforcer whistles, resulting in all sellers quickly collecting their goods and running away to the 
subway station or to the nearby square. The perfumes are assumed by enforcers to originate from 
China or Turkey. They sell for ten euros, yielding a profit of five to seven euros per bottle. In order 
not to compete too much with each other, sellers report making arrangements regarding the selling 
price. Sellers buy these perfumes from intermediates (arrangements are made by phone so that 
street vendors cannot identify the supply depot), who buy the goods in large quantities from 
importers in Antwerp or Ostend. In order to reduce risk, communications are done by mobile phone 
instead of in person. In this way, suppliers avoid being identified by street sellers, who thus cannot 
give information on their suppliers or stocking place to enforcers. 
Outside the main entrance of the market, between shops/cafés and parking spaces, people wander 
around on weekends to sell different goods (e.g., sunglasses, smartphones, discs). On Fridays, 
Saturdays and Sundays, cigarette sellers offer their products in a rather subtle manner (by gently 
saying ‘cigarettes, cigarettes?’). On Sundays, the number of sellers can be as high as 25, but is 
significantly smaller on Fridays. This difference is related to the number of clients, which is higher on 
the weekend. Two main groups of sellers are discernible, each working on their own territory: Polish 
and Romanian sellers work at the top of the market (in front of the East European shops) whereas 
North African sellers conduct their business further down. Interestingly, East European sellers are not 
there on Fridays. North African sellers work on the three market days, irrespective of the weather.  
Common to both groups of sellers is their adaptation to controls by enforcers; in order to minimise 
the financial setback of confiscation, they do not carry their cigarettes on their person (see also 
Coletto, 2010). Accordingly, enforcers cannot prove they are selling cigarettes and thus cannot 
confiscate them. Instead, the cigarettes are hidden in the near surroundings: in shopping bags 
between or in parked vans, in neighbouring houses or in shops. The formal businesses employed as 
storage places in this trade are largely assumed to be aware of the practice. Although no direct proof 
is available, some experts believe the legal business receives a (financial) reward for its involvement. 
Some sellers work with messengers who guard the stock and bring the cigarettes when the sellers 
need to be supplied. Not all sellers employ messengers and the ones who do mainly make use of 
their services on busy Sundays. In addition to these messengers, ‘observers’ are believed by one 
enforcer to be on the lookout for enforcers, although this is denied by one seller. Although cigarettes 
are offered per carton, they can also be bought singly or per pack. Larger quantities are not sold at 
the market itself, but orders can be placed there, just as they can be placed over the phone. The 
price per carton ranges between €20 and €25, depending on the brand. Sellers do not always have all 
the usual brands in stock; their trade depends on what their suppliers can sell them. At the market, 
illicit whites (e.g., Viceroy), counterfeit (e.g., Marlboro) and contrabandxi (e.g., L&M) cigarettes are 
sold.  
‘Independent’ informal selling 
In the street opposite the private market, a specific type of informal street business exists, linked to 
car import-export companies. One of the main activities is the purchase of cars intended for resale 
and export to Africa. Usually, the cars, sometimes wrecks according to Western standards, are filled 
with different goods such as old TVs, mattresses or car parts, which are sold in Africa. On arrival, 
these cars are either still used as a means of transportation or cannibalised and their parts used to 
repair other cars. A seller explained that people on the street execute different activities such as 
making contact with car traders, negotiating prices, searching for specific car parts, selling stolen car 
items, servicing cars, cannibalising cars and cleaning cars. The people involved originate mainly from 
Niger, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal. One seller explained that sellers of the same nationality group 
together. According to him, difficulties can arise within groups (e.g. delivering wrong goods, not 
paying in time), which are sorted out internally, sometimes with the use of violence.  
Less visible is the sale of goods in cafés in the area of Brussels South. Although this type of selling 
exceeds the geographical boundaries of the case, the city centre is avoided because of additional 
difficulties linked to the presence of tourists (e.g., more café owners refusing entrance to sellers, 
more controls). Goods such as clothes, watches, gadgets and discs are widely sold in cafés, implying 
serious competition between sellers. One clothes seller, however, did not perceive other sellers as 
competition, given the quick rotation of clients in cafés. Most sellers have regular cafés and regular 
clients. The preference for cafés owned and visited by immigrant people is explained as follows: 
‘Ah, it is really another world. So, it is a Moroccan café, I mean the owner is of Moroccan 
origin. A lot of Moroccans drink tea. Someone comes, even someone from black Africa 
or the Eastern Bloc, and he comes to sell something. They are not astonished, they are 
not shocked. Why? For two reasons: they know that this man has no, erm, that it is his 
income. But also, in his home country it is a [customary] method of trade’. (EI2). 
According to a social worker, clothes sellers can pay their suppliers (e.g. Pakistani wholesalers) later 
in case they do not possess the necessary capital to buy their merchandise (insofar as the seller-
supplier relationship is characterised by a certain level of trust). Another option is to buy the clothes 
at a market, where it is not necessary to buy in large quantities.  
Discs (mostly of films, but sometimes also music) are sold by sellers of different nationalities (e.g., 
Nigerian, Kenyan, Moroccan, Guinean, Congolese). One enforcer assumed the market for this type of 
trade was significantly decreasing given the expanding opportunities for individuals to watch films 
(e.g., digital TV) or listen to music (e.g., legal and illegal downloads). Nevertheless, for the poor 
population it might remain an attractive market if they cannot afford digital TV or the internet. Albeit 
quite uniform, the method of working shows some small differences. Some sellers display discs on 
tables, walk around the café, return to tables to probe interest in purchase. After that, all discs are 
collected. Others however show their discs per table and stay at the table while clients study the 
deal. Sellers work nearly every day. According to some respondents, pirated discs are also sold in 
video-shops. These shops are believed to fabricate their own copies in order to survive given the high 
competition of the internet. One former disc seller even believes video-shops send out sellers on the 
streets as well.  
The sale of discs in cafés (referred to as ‘peddling’ by Antonopoulos et al., 2011) is characterised by 
several degrees of professionalisation. Large-scale dealers (originating from Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Kenya), using sophisticated machinery, employ many sellers who are subject to different payment 
modalities: (1) income depends upon the number of discs sold, (2) no wage is paid, but free board 
and lodging are offered and (3) fixed day/month salary (approximately €150/month). Additionally, a 
seller explained that small-scale dealers work with less sophisticated machinery, which is also used 
by sellers who have enough capital to buy a duplicating machine in order to copy discs. On the other 
hand, some suppliers frequent the cafés and streets to sell: 
‘Yeah, you have to. You give to people, you wait for your money, but sometimes you 
have to wait a long time for your money. And then people disappear because they are 
arrested… It has its risks. It’s really survival, it’s not erm… Yeah, it is big business and you 
can earn a living out of it but it’s always a cat-and-mouse game with the police, eh?’. 
(EI6). 
Enforcement of informal street selling? 
Many public and private enforcement actors are involved in the policing of street trade, which 
implies the presence of plural policing (Jones and Newburn, 2006a). Enforcement of the specific 
ambulatory trade regulation is the responsibility of the police, the economic inspectoratexii and the 
organisers of the markets. In this respect, the private market organiser hires private security 
(“manned guarding” [van Steden and Huberts, 2006, p. 19] or “manned or staffed services” 
[Wakefield, 2003, p. xxi] as a type of commercial security) and has installed CCTV (“technical 
equipment services” [van Steden and Huberts, 2006, p. 21] or “security hardware industry” 
[Wakefield, 2003, p. xxi] as a type of commercial security) to keep informal sellers out of the market 
(e.g., cigarette sellers) and to detect small crime (e.g., pickpocketing).Given the limited public police 
patrols in the private market for these goalsxiii, the private owners of the market have turned to 
private policing in order to protect their business. A proper arrangement of the market is 
furthermore endeavoured by employing parking controllers (cashing parking money), market 
controllers (verifying the correct emplacement of stall holders and cashing their placement fee) and 
waste controllers. This finding is in line with Wakefield (2003) stating that: “the expansion of mass 
private property has already placed large areas that form sites of public life under the control of 
private security” (p. 56).  
Given the nature of the activities, additional public enforcers are active in controlling the Brussels 
street trade such as the social inspectorate (verifying employees' credentials). The sale of counterfeit 
goods falls within the scope of the police and economic inspectorate. In terms of detection, however, 
neither of these actors gives high priority to street selling or counterfeitingxiv. What is more, the 
police are rather tolerant of street selling, especially in the Brussels South area, given that it enables 
people to survive and, according to some enforcers, that it is not perceived as serious crime. 
Furthermore, the perceived lack of judicial consequences does not enhance the prioritising. Although 
most police forces have a special unit which works to detect counterfeiting, in general local 
authorities are more concerned with social disorder and infractions directly threatening physical 
harm instead of counterfeiting. One enforcer said: 
‘I mean, I’m gonna buy a Dolce and Gabbana t-shirt, you’re not gonna feel attacked by 
that. You’re not afraid. I’m not gonna beat you. You’re not attacked. So, the feeling of 
insecurity, produced by counterfeiting, there’s no feeling of insecurity, hey. But if I come 
to steal from you or beat you or steal your purse, that’s a feeling of insecurity. So, you 
personally will be hurt. Then it becomes a priority. But the counterfeit Dolce and 
Gabbana or Louis Vuitton or whatever that I’m gonna buy, how does it hurt you? No 
hey…. That doesn’t have an impact on people. And politically, it hasn’t got an impact.’ 
(EE6) 
Furthermore, enforcers claim informal street selling is seldom prosecuted in Brusselsxv owing to the 
high workload of the public prosecutor, the small number of complaints by (informal) employees and 
the lack of physical harm. Only in serious cases (e.g., multi-recidivists, human trafficking, 
employment of four or more illegal workers) does prosecution take place. Whether or not sellers of 
counterfeit products are prosecuted is believed to depend on the workload of the prosecutor. In 
order to avoid people feeling they can act with impunity, other consequences are linked to 
infractions such as administrative fines, confiscation and voluntary renunciation of goods.  
In terms of private industry, however, counterfeiting and piracy can have serious financial 
implications. With regard to counterfeiting, brand holders can join organisations that organise the 
detection of counterfeit products (e.g., by hiring private detectives who execute investigative 
functions for private companies [Jones and Newburn, 2006b; van Steden and Hubers, 2006]). In our 
case, their job mainly constitutes the gathering of information, which is subsequently handed over to 
the brand holder or to the police who can execute further investigations. In this respect, the relation 
between public policing agents and private detectives is characterised by a co-operative relationship 
(Jones and Newburn, 2006b). This takes on the form of operational co-operation (i.e. actual 
contribution in research activities of one another) and offering advice (i.e. giving advice and 
background information on goods and services that can be useful for investigation) (Mulkers, 
2002)xvi. The tobacco industry also hires private detectives to gather information in order to hand it 
over to public authorities. Likewise, private detectives  work for the music industry, focusing on the 
identification of the sources of piracy. Notably, although detection of piracy and counterfeiting is 
important for the private industry, the focus is not necessarily on street sellers. Whereas some brand 
holders adopt a zero-tolerance policy, starting a civil court procedure for each counterfeit item 
seized, others only take action when a predetermined minimum amount is detected. Accordingly, 
informal sellers do not face frequent or high risks from this enforcement scope.  
The presence of private policing actors, in addition to public actors, is explained in public policing 
literature by several changes in the structure of formal social control, offering a more extensive role 
for private security personnel in public social life (Mulkers, 2002; Wakefield, 2003). At least in Britain, 
this is related to an increasing demand for greater security in a climate of declining faith in the 
police’s ability to prevent crime. In this respect, private policing can be implemented in the public 
sector in order to decrease perceived anti-social conduct in these spaces (Wakefield, 2003). But, in 
the case of informal street selling, private policing agents seem to be brought into action not only to 
this end. In addition to providing a sense of security, private agents are hired and private security is 
installed to protect the private business and its interests: the correct and honest execution of the 
market in order not to scare off clients and stall holders; tackling of unfair competition for brands by 
searching for the origin of counterfeitingxvii. It is unclear which intention has the most weight, but the 
private policing agents are clearly focused on both ensuring the security of the public and on 
protecting the interests of the private businesses. To this latter goal, there is a form of co-operation 
between public and private agents, in the form of information exchange.  
Choosing informal street trade: profile, organisation and motives of sellers 
The sellers 
The interviewed street sellers were of different nationalities: Moroccan, Polish, Mauritanian, 
Nigerian, Tunisian, Senegalese and Belgian. The majority of them were illegal, although in the course 
of the research one seller was notified that he could stay permanently as his child was born in 
Belgium. Of the six sellers who resided legally in the country, two still had a regularisation 
applicationxviii running. Only one respondent was a formal, registered seller; the other 17 were 
informal sellers. 
This sample cannot be taken as representative of the whole sector. Notwithstanding that, all 
respondents indicated that informal street selling is mostly executed by migrants (non-
autochthonous people). Despite the high number of ‘illegal’ people participating in this type of 
activity, informal street trade is not exclusively the domain of people residing illegally in the country. 
For instance, legal residents in search of extra income (partly owing to the economic crisis) are 
equally involved in this business. Nearly all informal sellers are male, although some exceptions exist 
such as female East European cigarette sellers.  
Starting the business 
Social capital is of crucial importance for starting up as an informal seller. In line with Bourdieu (1986) 
and Leerkes et al. (2006), we describe social capital as the ability to mobilise resources (money, 
employment, housing, information, documents) from ethnic and familial networks. Especially for 
illegal people, friends, family or acquaintances play a crucial role in making contact with potential 
employers (both in markets and outside, e.g., in construction sector) or other sellers, which is 
confirmed by empirical research on survival strategies of illegal people in Belgium (Devillé, 2006; van 
Meeteren et al., 2009). Furthermore, with regard to disc-sellers, experienced sellers or dealers would 
test people (who they perceive are in need of money) by giving them some discs to sell. If they are 
successful, they can continue. One intermediate put it as follows: 
‘It’s all about the money, they are just surviving. But it’s a real network, because 
newcomers see that, they just accompany a friend who is doing that with another 
friend. He sees that: ah, what is it? That’s the way it goes. But they're not gonna do that 
with just anybody’. (EI6) 
Occasionally, sellers start on their own account, by asking established sellers what they need to do or 
whom they need to contact in order to start. After initial contacts in the car business, a newcomer 
needs to be tested for trustworthiness by completing a sort of internship. The same holds for selling 
in cafés: if problems arise, the newcomer is not welcome anymore. This finding indicates that sellers 
partly rely on the goodwill of café-holders. 
In addition to social capital, money, as a result of economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986), is a prerequisite. 
For instance, cigarette sellers need to buy their merchandise in advance which can require start-up 
capital of €6,000 or €7,000. There are two reasons for this amount of capital: (1) a seller wants to buy 
several brands to reach more clients and (2) sellers cannot buy small quantities of cigarettes. First, 
suppliers would not sell limited quantities but second, since not all brands are available at all times, 
some sellers build up a reserve of certain brands. In order to copy discs, one needs a minimum of 
about €100 to €200 for the purchase of a computer, duplicating machine, blank discs, cover sleeves 
and a little bag to store the discs. Of course, more expensive machinery exists for copying discs, but 
less advanced machinery also does the trick. If sellers do not have this kind of start-up capital, they 
can sell discs for dealers and receive a commission or – as is the case for clothes, for example – they 
can pay for their goods after they have sold them. Thus, economic capital is less important than 
social capital.  
Specialisation, organisation of work and income 
With the exception of the sale of cigarettes, no consensus exists on specialisation. Whereas some 
sellers and intermediates argue that sellers stick to one type of good, others sell different types of 
goods in order to increase their income (e.g., belts and perfumes). Some sellers say they could sell 
different types of goods, but choose not to since they have a fixed clientele and some expertise in 
their business. Selling different goods would thus require an extra investment in those two areas. 
The number of days and hours sellers work varies, partly depending on the type of goods sold and on 
the location. Cigarette sellers work from approximately eight or nine in the morning to three or four 
in the afternoon. The North African sellers work there three days a week and search for other 
(informal) jobs during the week (mainly in construction or in markets), whereas the East European 
sellers do not work on Fridays (some not on Saturdays either). Despite the application of the same 
sale prices, one seller claimed no price arrangements are discussed between sellers but that 
experience has resulted in similar prices. In line with Bromley (2000), the interrelations between the 
sellers are characterised by both competition and support, although the latter is usually reserved for 
members of the same (religious) background. Each seller has regular clients and additionally 
approaches potential clients on the pavement. Since no formal arrangements exist between the 
sellers with regard to clients (except the above-mentioned territoriality), fights occasionally break out 
over clients: 
‘Me, I never fight. Never. But I see how people do it. For one client, for four euros, they 
fight. Because they need the money. They need it’. (SV3). 
Like cigarette sellers, other sellers who work in the surroundings of the markets adopt the latter's 
opening hours. Sellers in cafés on the other hand usually start after office hours, when clients start 
going to cafés. Their daily activities are diverse (e.g., going to school, buying merchandise, resting, 
searching for a job).  
The income from street selling depends upon the type of goods and external factors such as the 
number of clients and the weather. Illegal people selling in markets earn between €25 and €40 a day 
(implying over 12 hours of labour). As one intermediate said: 
‘They won’t exactly make a fortune. And it is extremely precarious, of course. But for 
people it is really a way to make ends meet, hoping to find housing and some food’. (EI5) 
The wage for odd jobs in markets is usually not agreed upon before the start since sellers do not 
want to be perceived by employers as ‘difficult’ or ‘making a lot of demands’ (SV13). Sellers receive 
what stallholders wish to give that day, which varies between two and ten euros (sometimes people 
are paid in kind). Complaints from workers are rare, because they need all the money they can get. 
The profit of cigarette sellers varies between one and four euros per carton sold, according to the 
brand and the number of cigarettes purchased (lower in the case of a large purchase). Income is 
higher on the weekend but differs between sellers: from €20 to €80 on Fridays and from €60 to €400 
on Sundays. Messengers are given some money at the end of the day, depending on the earnings of 
the seller they are working for. Sellers of phone cards claim benefits vary between half a euro and 
one euro per card sold, depending on the type of card. Again, during weekends and public holidays 
more cards are sold because of the larger market.  
The majority of the sellers claim their income from street selling is enough to survive, that is, to pay 
for rent, food, clothing and a cup of coffee once in a while. Of course, some sellers do not execute 
their activities solely within the geographical boundaries of the case study. Young males often share 
a studio in order to reduce the rent, whereas others live in squats. If their income is not sufficient, 
other solutions are sought, such as borrowing money from friends, voluntary work, stealing (only one 
seller admitted his friends tend to steal), reliance on social aid and/or other informal jobs (e.g., 
moving, construction, odd jobs). These jobs, which are often desired, are not easy to obtain for two 
reasons: (1) demand outstrips supply and (2) employers often recruit people they know they can 
trust, given the fact that, in construction for instance, the workers have to handle expensive 
materials. All in all, sellers' total income is either totally informal or a combination of formal and 
informal sources.  
Why informal street selling? 
Survival is uniformly acknowledged to be the main reason for starting informal street trade. In many 
cases, informal sellers are not permitted to reside and/or work legally in the country. Accordingly, 
because of the lack of viable (income) alternatives, informal street trade is opted for with the 
intention to meet basic needs: 
‘But yeah, it’s just a survival strategy. Also, rent is always high here. So, in order to apply 
for papers, you need an address. In order to have an address, you need to pay. In order 
to pay, you need a job, well yeah a job or you work on the side or you know, then they 
know someone from their country who’s selling discs and who’s going to cafés to sell 
discs at three euro, five euro’. (EI6) 
‘Many people who work undeclared are people who are not officially resident, illegal 
people, so they cannot do otherwise than work undeclared’. (EE3) 
Whereas the lack of official papers can be understood as a reason to start informal selling, a social 
worker argues that even when people have residence and work permits some continue their  
activities partly because they cannot meet formal work criteria (e.g., language skills, qualifications) 
(EI4). For instance, practical experience is usually not enough to get a formal job; certificates are 
equally required: 
‘And it is very…, I think that informal economy is so popular because it’s so hard to go 
formal. Who wants someone who doesn’t speak Dutch or French well, or who's 40 or 50 
years old?’ (EI4) 
Additionally, informal street selling can supplement insufficient income (be it from social benefit or 
from formal or informal labour): 
‘Many people do that to have an additional income. Their goal is not to earn billions and 
billions and billions…it’s more to improve their daily life, you see. So, they tell 
themselves: “Oh well, it doesn’t hurt anyone, I don’t steal, anyway, I’m not gonna take 
your purse, I’m not gonna steal food, I’m just doing a little business that’s harming no 
one. And I don’t harm the brands why? Because they have enough money”. Yes okay, 
but still, you don’t have to overdo it. The law is there for everybody’. (EE6) 
Interestingly, the decision to sell on the streets, in comparison with other informal business, can be a 
result of the reflection of standard economic activities in the home country of sellers. Remarkably, 
some sellers prefer to work as an ‘independent’ seller than as an employee in a market since the 
latter makes them feel exploited: 
‘They don’t have papers, you see? So, if they don’t work, what will they do to pay rent 
and all? Otherwise they will sleep outside. For instance, if you work with people on the 
market, you’ll earn €25 and have to be at the market at four in the morning until five in 
the evening. So €25, I don’t think this is right. You see? Because people here take 
advantage of people without papers’.  (SV11) 
One seller interviewed quit his market activity and started as an independent seller for this reason. 
On the other hand, some sellers do not quit their informal job since they need the money 
(notwithstanding that they are aware they are underpaid): 
‘I can put up with being exploited because I want to eat, I don’t want to sleep in the 
streets’. (SV13)  
In line with previous research on migrant entrepreneurial activities in Greece (Lazaridis and 
Koumandraki, 2003), the preference for self-employment can equally be prompted by psychological 
advantages such as experienced freedom and the wish not to get employers into trouble. In addition, 
the lack of representation of (informal) street sellers and their limited organisational power may also 
explain their lack of rebellion. Sellers find the work hard and would prefer to do other work (e.g., 
work for which they are actually qualified). Notably, most street sellers do not call their activities a 
job, but refer to it as ‘temporary aid’ (SV13) or ‘a defence’ (SV6) (the latter referring to police being 
able to confiscate goods). They do not refer to it as a regular job, given the fact that a regular job 
entails a long-term legal contract (they are well aware of the fact that their activities are not legal). 
Most street traders interviewed furthermore acknowledge the non-legal aspect of their income-
earning activities, but perceive it as a better alternative than stealing or selling drugs, albeit for 
different reasons. For instance, one seller prefers not to sell cigarettes for religious reasons: 
‘Cigarettes? I don’t do cigarettes. No, it’s “haram”, it’s not good. It’s selling poison to 
others’. (SV6) 
Another seller does not wish to steal or sell drugs because of the higher prison sentence: 
‘You’re going to steal or something and one day or another they’re going to catch you. If 
you sell drugs too, one day or another they’re going to catch you. You’ll go to prison, I 
don’t like that. We’re already in a prison’. (SV3)  
Another seller stresses he wants to do something to earn money: 
‘I’m obliged to do anything to make a living. I have my mother, she needs money in 
Morocco. Here, I have a house, I need to pay for it. I don’t have social welfare, I don’t 
have an unemployment allowance, so what would  I do? Better to steal or what? I prefer 
to work like that, I sell cigarettes. I’d sell anything, but I don’t steal. I don’t have a habit 
of stealing. Now I feel I’m working, you see. I work, I don’t do something bad’. (SV11) 
Another seller put it like this : 
‘I’m not a criminal, I’m not a seller of drugs, I’m not a thief, nothing like that. I’m a man 
who wants to live like everybody else’. (SV9) 
The perception of informal street trade (even when counterfeit goods are sold) as a better 
alternative than stealing (or other crimes) is shared by some intermediates and enforcers, who point 
to the lack of physical harm or lack of feelings of insecurity this offers: 
‘Ow they don’t have another choice eh. What do they have to do otherwise? It’s still 
better than stealing eh. Come on, in the end, they do something, they sell something eh. 
They do not steal’. (EI6) 
Strikingly, one enforcer even labels the illegal employment in markets as a form of solidarity, 
characteristic of Islam. Given the low enforcement priority attributed to (informal) street selling in 
combination with the necessity of survival, the low deterrence value of controls on informal street 
sellers is not surprising. First of all, the police as an institution hold no fear for African sellers: 
‘The police here are peanuts. There, you are really afraid of the police, eh. They beat you 
and all eh. I mean… so they just laugh at them here. Just out of fear to get sent back, 
that yeah. They all have that, they all have that. But real fear of the police? No’. (EI6)  
A differential influence of the potential implications of control can be detected. Since many sellers do 
not possess much, they are not able (or claim not to be able) to pay the fines. Furthermore, the risk 
of imprisonment is low. Although repatriation is perceived as rather uncommon, many sellers 
somehow still fear the risk, but by working in visible and accessible places such as markets, illegal 
people only increase the risk of being arrested, not of being expelled.xix The consequence that 
undoubtedly hurts the most is the confiscation of goods, which most sellers interviewed have already 
been subjected to (one seller losing up to €4,000 in two years). The lack of judicial consequences also 
has low deterrent power: 
‘So I think that if you know “today I am caught and next month I go to court” you will 
think twice. If you are caught today and you don’t appear in court within two years and 
you have already received a letter saying you are dismissed… Plus, six months pass 
between the time you are caught and the time you receive the first letter. These people 
have to survive so they just continue’. (EI8) 
The continuation of informal activities does not imply a total lack of enforcement influence, however. 
Two sellers stopped and/or did not restart their activities and some sellers adapted their selling 
strategies in order to reduce the risk of getting caught (e.g., only doing business indoors with 
trustworthy clients). In sum, the enforcement side of the policy hardly deters people from informal 
selling given their need for income and the lack of viable alternatives. 
Beyond the streets: a reflection 
The above-mentioned results offer some important insights for sociologists and criminologists 
although the case, an area of urban poverty, might have influenced the results (e.g. overestimation 
of the survival function of the informal economy, confirmation of one single theoretisation on 
informal economy) (Williams, Nadin and Rodgers, 2012). Nonetheless, our study reveals some 
important similarities with studies in other countries, such as the adoption of defence strategies 
(Coletto, 2010), sale of counterfeit goods (Coletto, 2010) and deterrent influence of confiscation 
(Coletto, 2010; Nelken, 2006; Reyneri, 2004). As in previous research, barriers to formalisation 
(Alderslade et al., 2006) and lack of alternative opportunities (Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2003) are 
important in understanding why people turn to the informal economy, in this case informal street 
selling, reflecting a structuralist explanation of informal entrepreneurship (Williams et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, in a way, street selling is a ‘logical’ option since it requires relatively few competences 
(e.g., language or professional skills), is relatively accessible (given its high visibility and its execution 
by peers) and is for many migrant sellers a habitual method of income generation (similar to 
behaviour in their home country). Furthermore, this activity leans very closely to the legal trade, both 
for sellers and for customers. This however does not detract from the precarious position of street 
sellers given their working conditions (long hours, all weathers, unpredictable clients, the 
susceptibility to controls) and the illegal status of many sellers. Their livelihood is characterised by a 
high degree of uncertainty. These findings indicate that informal economic activity is not solely 
driven by the desire of employees to circumvent regulations and financial (social and tax) 
contributions. Moreover, they reflect the strength of people (e.g., flexibility, agency), who survive in 
precarious circumstances, partly thanks to the entrepreneurial skills reflected in their street-selling 
activities. For people residing legally in the country, this survival function is less dominant (they have 
more easily access to welfare), although it still fulfils the function of income generation. Thus, their 
activities can also be explained by the structuralist theoretisation on informal entrepreneurship 
(Williams et al., 2012). Here too, accessibility and few requirements in terms of conditions to start up 
a street business play an important role in the selection of this type of informal work. In case of 
labour relations, the hiring of illegal and/or undeclared personnel is inspired by the wish or even 
need not to pay the minimum wages.  
In regard to the policy on street selling, the regulation of ambulatory trade does not have a great 
influence on informality. Regarding the enforcement side of the policy, the deterrent influence of 
confiscation is not unique to the Brussels situation (Coletto, 2010; Nelken, 2006; Reyneri, 2004). 
Sellers furthermore risk forced repatriation (if they reside illegally in the country), fines (if they do 
not possess an employment card) or adjustment of social benefits (if they receive them). In practice 
however, forced repatriation is perceived by sellers, enforcers and intermediates to be rarexx. Since 
migrants who are theoretically not authorised to stay and/or work in the country continue to find 
their way to Brussels without being encouraged to return (i.e., low risk of forced repatriation, see 
infra), they have to find ways to support themselves. In an urban area with many inhabitants of 
similar origin, they gravitate toward a type of informal income-generating activity that thrives in such 
a setting. In this respect, the specific regulation of street trade seems to have less influence on 
informality - executed by illegal migrants - than the migration policy, which does not allow people 
without a residence permit to work formally and which does not always enable forced repatriation 
(see infra). Some migrants live for over ten years in Belgium without any guarantee that they will be 
given legal status, which illustrates significant flaws in the policy.  
Low prioritising 
Why does informal street selling continue in Brussels, notwithstanding the possibility to control the 
situation (the concentration of sellers in the surroundings of the market is well-known to enforcers) 
and the economic/financial reasons (e.g. loss of taxes in case of cigarette sale) for intervention? 
What are the explanations for the policy of tolerance or laissez-faire approachxxi (Williams et al., 
2012, p. 528)? First of all, informal street selling and counterfeiting are no official priority for the 
local public enforcers (local police in the area [ZVP 2009-2012]xxii, the economic and social 
inspectorate). No real link between street selling and serious or organised crime is perceived. At best, 
the sale of cigarettes is perceived as the last link in a broader network. In this respect attention is 
more focused on the underlying networks and the origin of the cigarettes than on the street level. 
Furthermore, since the markets take place on weekends (except for the private one which also takes 
place on Fridays), controls should take place during weekends, when enforcers cost more due to 
higher remuneration during weekend hours. According to the immigration officer, the availability of 
personnel has an influence on the limited amount of controls in the case. Local authorities are 
believed to prefer mobilization of expensive personnel for phenomena, which receive higher priority. 
Accordingly, the high workload of the public prosecutor dictates a preference for ‘more serious’ 
offences, which do greater harm (financial, societal and/or physical). Since detecting and prosecuting 
all infractions is impossible, the decision to focus on infractions resulting in great harm is 
understandable and desirable. Much depends, however, on the question ‘harm to whom’? In theory, 
informal street selling can harm the legal industry (e.g., tobacco industry, brands such as Louis 
Vuitton, Dior, etc.), clients (e.g., bad quality) and inhabitants (e.g., nuisance). In our case such harm is 
seen as minimal by all except a few respondents (enforcers specialised in detecting counterfeit goods 
and private detectives working for the private industry). As little attention is paid to street selling in 
terms of policy, the welfare of the informal sellers seems to be of small concern, although one of the 
government’s tasks is to protect all its citizens. One can hypothesise that the government gives 
priority to the safety of its legal residents over the safety of the illegal and more marginalised 
residents, who are less influential. Of course, the government does provide support for (illegal) 
migrants by way of social inspectoratexxiii, non-profit organisations and social workers. In essence, 
however, the informal sellers in this case fall well outside the scope of these institutions for different 
reasons. In some sense, they are characterised by a certain ‘visible invisibility’.  
Third, although the enforcement establishment knows where informal selling takes place, it faces 
several practical difficulties in controlling street selling (e.g., informal sellers running away, referred 
to as a ‘cat-and-mouse game’). Enforcers claim these experienced difficulties do not play a role in the 
low ranking of enforcement of informal street selling. However, some do acknowledge it as ‘beating 
one’s head against a brick’, thus reflecting low belief in the effectiveness of enforcementxxiv. As Bacon 
(2013a; 2013b) has illustrated in policing illegal drug markets, such occupational beliefs may 
influence the everyday practice of enforcersxxv. However, in Bacon’s study, policing drug markets was 
an official priority of the police, whereas policing informal street trade (and counterfeiting linked to 
street trade) in our studied area is not an official priority for the police (ZVP 2009-2012). As such, 
there is no unofficial deprioritising (in favour of crimes perceived as more pressing to deal with) of an 
official priority. Notwithstanding, the same rationale of enforcers can be detected in both studies: 
focus on the perceived ‘severe’ cases, i.e. those linked with crime. At best, in the case of informal 
street selling, there is an unofficial confirmation of deprioritising. However, since the occupational 
culture of enforcers was not the focus of this study and was thus not studied through ethnographic 
fieldwork (as Bacon did), this remains a mere hypothesis. 
Fourth, several public actors are authorised to enforce the regulations, resulting in the bizarre 
situation whereby each actor admits the low priority given to the phenomenon of street selling but 
at the same time referring to other actors who are supposed to be more active in this regard. In the 
end, no clear public ownership of the problem exists. The legal private industry, which has more 
interest in the phenomenon (because of the unfair competition and potential loss of clients), could 
be a major player, but since its main concern is the origin and distribution of counterfeit goods it 
focuses on those higher in the chain than street sellers. The fact that informal street selling provides 
goods that satisfy the needs of low-income clients in big cities (e.g., counterfeit cigarettes; Sassen, 
2007) does not put enough weight in the balance. Concerning the relation between the public and 
private policing actors, no public-private partnerships are present (van Steden and Huberts, 2006). 
There is however a co-operation - in the form of proactive and reactive information exchange - 
between public actors and private investigators in the detection of counterfeiting. In the 
enforcement of the other types of informal street selling, the exchange of information is strictly 
reactive: when small crimes or unlicensed sellers (more specifically subtype 3 of informality within 
markets) are detected by the private security (and goods are confiscated), the police are informed by 
the managers of the private market. In this respect, the blurring of boundaries between public and 
private roles (Crawford et al., 2005; Wakefield, 2003) is not a real issue in this case and hardly counts 
as an explanation for the low prioritising of informal street selling by public actors. All in all, as in 
other countries (e.g. Reyneri, 2004 for Italy) street selling and counterfeiting are not high on the 
government's list of priorities. 
Influence of migration policy 
Strikingly, the Belgian government preserves the informal economy on two levels, first and foremost 
by the implementation of a policy of tolerance on a local level. On the federal level, the preservation 
is more indirect. As already mentioned, by failing to adhere to an effective enforcement of the 
migration policyxxvi, Belgium (and specifically Brussels) is confronted with people who remain 
officially under the radar. Migration to Belgium is regulated by one major law (‘Foreigners’ law’)xxvii, 
that distinguishes two types of admission to the country: (1) short stay (less than three months)xxviii 
and (2) long stay (over three months). The law identifies five different juridical motives for obtaining 
a residence permit: international protection (asylum), reunification of a family, economic motives, 
study related reasons and regularisation procedures (CGKR, 2013) (e.g., regularisation for medical or 
humanitarian reasons). The procedure potential migrants need to follow (and the criteria they need 
to meet), depends upon their juridical motive and should in principle be started in the country of 
originxxix. Some of our respondents entered the European Union or Belgium legally (i.e. in accordance 
with the different criteria of entry) – but their stay exceeded the permitted term or their procedure 
was still running (in which case they reside legally) – whereas others entered illegally. 
The flaws in the enforcement of the migration policy in our case are mainly visible in the deficient 
tracing and repatriation of migrants of third countriesxxx in illegal stay. Theoretically, when arrested, 
migrants in illegal stay receive an order to leave the country (the date by which they should leave is 
mentioned on the order). In most cases, these migrants are encouraged to leave the country 
independentlyxxxi. Migrants can organise their return with their own financial resources or can make 
use of programs offered by the International Organisation for Migration (Roosemont, 2009). In our 
study, a clear tolerance towards the presence of certain illegal migrants is detected. According to the 
local police, they do not actively look for or arrest migrants of North-African or Pakistani origin in 
illegal stay. They do not wish to devote precious time to this activityxxxii, knowing effective results – 
return or forced repatriation – will fail to happen. What happens when they detect and arrest such a 
migrant? The police officer explains that in 99% of the cases, the Immigration Office delivers an order 
to leave the country immediately. They do not deliver an order to leave the country with 
administrative detention in a centre (where illegal migrants reside awaiting their involuntary 
expulsion). Two respondents differ in the perceived reasons for this. The police officer claims that (1) 
North African countries do not easily retrieve their own citizens (which is denied by the immigration 
officer)xxxiii and (2) the Immigration Office wishes to avoid too many people of the same ethnic 
background in closed, secured centres in order to avoid riots. The immigration officer however refers 
to the foreigners’ law, which states that administrative detention in a closed centre can only be 
executed in view of forced repatriation. In case the immigration office knows that repatriation is not 
possible (because the migrant cannot be adequately identified), migrants cannot be detained in a 
closed centre. Indeed, identification and identification documents are necessary to return to the 
home country. According to the immigration officer, illegal migrants are aware of this and adopt 
several strategies to hinder their identification (e.g., deliberately not carrying identification 
documents). This is confirmed by one interviewed seller, explaining his deliberate use of a false name 
when arrested. What is the result of all this? An ordinary order to leave the country is handed over to 
these migrants without detention in a closed centre. Thus, these migrants are supposed to leave the 
country within a certain time framexxxiv independently, which is why they are released from the police 
station. Since most of these migrants do not return to their home country, they stay in Brussels and 
continue their survival activities. This scenario is well known within the police force (and within the 
immigration office), and influences their daily activities – which is in line with Bacon (2012a; 2013b). 
The presence of illegal migrants is thus a societal reality, of which the government is well aware. We 
identify two more potential reasons why the government, despite the obvious advantages of 
‘cleaning up’ the sector (and more specifically criminal cigarette selling), chooses not to dispel this 
type of informal trade. Not only would displacement be a more realistic outcome than the 
disappearance of the informal street trade but, more importantly, all those relying on it would be 
faced with serious losses (e.g., poor clients, traders going bankrupt, illegal people losing an important 
source of income), possibly resulting in social disorder or criminality and confronting the government 
with its inability to handle the consequences of migration. In this respect, informal street selling 
might be perceived as a social safety net, a means of income for people who would otherwise risk 
committing crime, rioting or revolution (Bhowmik, 2005; Bromley, 2000; Coletto, 2010, 2013; 
Morales, 2000). This hypothesis is confirmed by the neutralisation of informal street selling by 
enforcers, intermediates and sellers, who claim that informal street selling is a better alternative 
than stealing or other serious crimes. All in all, different assumptions about informal street selling 
and informal sellers and certain migration policy issues shape the low enforcement prioritisation of 
the phenomenon. 
Associated with the difficult enforcement of migration policy is the understanding expressed by 
social workers and North African sellers that many North African illegal migrants experience 
difficulties returning home, because of unrealistic perceptions of Europe in their home countries (i.e. 
as a ‘land of milk and honey’). These unrealistic perceptions not only lead to migrants feeling 
disillusioned, but also cause them to regret having migrated and feelings of failurexxxv. Since their 
actual situation is rarely communicated to family and friends in the home country, we see it as the 
government’s task to prevent this by setting up and expanding effective information campaignsxxxvi in 
popular emigration countries (e.g., Morocco [CGKR, 2013]). 
Conclusion 
Our results confirm the interrelation between the formal, informal and criminal economies, in terms 
of work as a unit of analysis (e.g., involvement of formal enterprises in storage of goods sold 
informally or illegally afterwards) and of workers as a unit of analysis. Similar to Coletto’s (2013) 
study on street vendors in Brazil, our results indicate that street sellers have no homogeneous 
profiles and well-defined boundaries. Workers, in this case street sellers, can be regulated (formal 
workers, e.g., declared employment), can fall outside the scope of regulation (e.g., working and/or 
residing illegally in the country, working on an undeclared basis) or can shift between being and not 
being regulated (e.g., employment being declared one day, but not another day). Although workers 
and their work are not necessarily officially regulated, informal self-regulation does apply to the case. 
In this respect, sellers have a reputation to keep up so they cannot afford to sell poor-quality 
products (e.g., blank discs, stolen goods). Furthermore, territoriality prevails, as found in Coletto’s 
(2010) study on street traders in Brazil. All in all, informal trade finds a space between the imposition 
of regulations and the poor enforcement of those regulations. This confirms our definition of 
informal economy as those economic activities that are not officially regulated and enforced. 
Although Cross (2000) attributes the lack of enforcement to a combination of the inability of the 
state to do so and the ability of the poor and unorganised to oppose enforcement, we have 
attributed this mainly to a lack of willingness by the state to give the matter high priority and to the 
tolerance of state agencies. Although we have indicated some potential explanations for this, we 
argue the need (at least) to monitor this situation, given the extreme precariousness of the situation 
in which many street sellers find themselves. We furthermore argue the conceptual relevance of our 
empirical study given the nuances it highlights. We have not only identified different types of 
informal economic activities within the sector of street selling, but we have also found varying 
motives for informality (e.g. ,informal street selling greatly but not solely as a survival economy) and 
contrasting influences on informality (e.g., deterrent influence of confiscation but lack of deterrent 
influence of forced repatriation of illegal migrants). We have furthermore identified several nuances 
in the policing of informal street selling. Furthermore, this case equally stresses that informal 
economic activities are not part of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but are not necessarily 
unknown to the government (e.g. registered offences). All in all, these conclusions stress the 
importance of careful use of general statements about ‘the’ informal economy.  
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i
 These authorities will change, however (the region and community levels will gain more authorities at the 
expense of federal government), as a result of the State Reform (the sixth in the history of Belgium)., which is .  
ii
 In this article, the terms street selling, street vending and street trade are used interchangeably.  
iii
 Thus, street selling is subject to the policy determined on the federal and municipal level regarding 
ambulatory trade. 
iv
 Law of 4 July 2006 amending that of 25 June 1993 regarding the execution of ambulatory activities and the 
organisation of public markets (Belgian Bulletin of Acts [B.B.A.] 25 August 2006).  
v
 This is a database hosting identification data of enterprises.  
vi
 In this article, regulation refers to the official body of laws and degrees at the federal, provincial and/or local 
level. Enforcement refers to actions by different official actors to verify compliance to the regulation. 
vii
 Sellers of different nationalities; sellers of different goods.  
viii
 For reasons of anonymity, we coded our respondents. SV: street vendor; ER: Expert Regulator (i.e. persons 
working for institutions authorised for establishing regulation); EE: Expert Enforcer (i.e. persons authorised to 
enforce the law, for instance police officers, members of economic inspectorate, immigration officer); EI: 
Expert Intermediate (i.e., social worker, street worker, member of the legal tobacco industry). 
ix
 The private market is privately owned, organised and exploited by a public limited company (plc), whereas 
the public market is organised and exploited by the municipality. Public accessibility to the private market is 
restricted to market days, whereas the public market space is constantly accessible.  
x
 Some foreigners need an employment card (which provides permission to work) in order to work legally. 
When they do not possess this card but are at work, this is also categorised as illegal employment.  
xi
 Illicit whites are produced legally for tax-free sale in a market where they are not sold legally. Contraband 
cigarettes are smuggled but are original brands. 
xii
 The enforcement service of the federal public service for economy, S.M.E.’s Self-Employed and Energy.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
xiii
 These patrols are more focused on ensuring security (reassuring the public [Wakefield, 2003, p. 53] than on 
law enforcement (enforcement of law related to street selling). 
xiv
 This service has a separate unit focusing on the detection of counterfeiting. Notwithstanding several 
attempts, we never received an answer to our request for an interview. 
xv
 Statistics from the public prosecutor, indicating the number of files in relation to street selling, reveal an 
incomplete picture, which is why they are not included in this article. They do, however, allow us to conclude 
that dismissal is by far the most frequent decision taken by the public prosecutor in such cases.  
xvi
 Notwithstanding the law on private detectives and the stringent regulations regarding the exchange of 
information by police that apply to the co-operation between both parties. 
xvii
 This is in line with Mulders’ (2002) definition of a private investigator as a detective investigating in exchange 
for a payment by a client in order to safeguard his or her interests and rights. 
xviii
 Regularisation is one method of receiving a residence permit. 
xix
 An enforcer claims the Immigration Office gives priority to the expulsion of illegal employees (in comparison 
with illegal people who work on their own account or who do not work) because the costs of expulsion are 
charged to the employer. Otherwise, the Belgian state has to pay for the expulsion costs.   
xx
 Statistics regarding repatriations in the Brussels Region were asked, but the Immigration Office was not able 
to provide them on that level. Statistics are only available on the federal level. Since migrants in illegal stay 
have no official place of residence (because they are in illegal stay) it is not possible for the Immigration Office 
to associate an illegal migrant to a certain municipality/city/region. Unfortunately thus, we cannot confirm this 
perception with statistics. 
xxi
 Which, in theory, is more related to a neo-liberal than a structuralist theoretisation on informal 
entrepreneurship (Williams et al., 2012). 
xxii
 In this policy plan, specific phenomena are the unit of analyses (e.g., theft in cars, youth criminality). In this 
respect, topics such as illegality, poverty or survival have no place in the policy plan of the local police.   
xxiii
 This enforcement service checks the correct implementation of the social security regulation. 
xxiv
 In order to be fully correct, perceptions of beating one’s head against a brick are also detected in enforcers 
specialised in detecting counterfeit, who do continue to search actively for counterfeited goods. However, 
since their domain of authorisation largely exceeds the case (both in terms of geographical boundaries as in 
terms of activities, i.e. also sale in shops), they cannot be focused entirely on informal street selling in Brussels 
South. 
xxv
 In the sense that officers do not always follow organisational rules and guidelines defined by policies, due to 
informal norms, values and beliefs which shape their decisions and behaviours (Bacon, 2013a). In short, Bacon 
(2013b) argues that decisions and behaviours of police officers are influenced by structural, cultural, personal 
and situational factors. 
xxvi
 Note that the same federal public service, namely the FPS Internal Affairs, covers Migration policy and 
Safety and Prevention.  
xxvii
 Law of 15 December 1980 concerning the admission to the territory, the stay, the settlement and the 
expulsion of migrants, Bulletin of Acts 31 December 1980. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
xxviii
 The permission for this type of stay (i.e. a visum) is also referred to as a Schengenvisum (CGKR, 2013, p. 36). 
xxix
 Exception to this principle is the regularisation of stay for humanitarian or medical reasons (CGKR, 2013). 
xxx
 Third countries are all countries but the EU-27 countries (CGKR, 2013). We focus on these countries since 
most migrants in the case originate from these countries (except the East-European cigarette sellers). 
xxxi
 In theory, the mayor or his proxy needs to verify - after the term to leave the country has elapsed – if the 
migrant has left the country by controlling his address. Furthermore, the mayor or his proxy is required to urge 
the police to continue executing such residence controls (Circular of 10 June 2011 concerning the authorities of 
the mayor in relation to the expulsion of a citizen of a third country). In a minority of the cases, illegal migrants 
are immediately sent to closed centres awaiting their involuntary expulsion (CGKR, 2013). According to the 
immigration officer, this is the case when an illegal migrant – who can be identified – has committed offenses 
against public order.   
xxxii
 The interviewed police officer refers to the administrative rigmarole this implies. 
xxxiii
 According to the CGKR (2013), the EU has agreements regarding taking over of citizens with 13 countries: 
Russia, Georgia, Moldavia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Hong Kong and Macao. However, the interviewed immigration officer argues information on such 
agreements is not communicated externally for two reasons: (1) avoid jeopardizing negotiations with countries 
and (2) agreements and cooperation with home countries often changes, e.g. in function of a change in regime. 
He thus doubts the reliability of the information of the CGKR (2013) on this point. During the interview with the 
immigration officer, we implicitly heard that cooperation with Pakistan is difficult, whereas many repatriated 
migrants return to Morocco (implying cooperation with Morocco).  
xxxiv
 An order to leave the country immediately still implies a period of 5 days before the person can be expulsed 
involuntarily.  
xxxv
 Some migrants, of course, do obtain residence permits and/or Belgian nationality, find jobs etc. and are 
thus perceived as successful migrants by their compatriots. Furthermore, given that they spend their holidays 
in their home countries, taking different luxuries with them (e.g., fancy cars, toys, clothing) they confirm the 
prevailing perception of a rich Europe. 
xxxvi
 Information – and dissuading campaigns were conducted in 2012 in Cameroun, Armenia, Kosovo, Albania, 
Serbia, Montenegro and Russia-Caucasian area (CGKR, 2013). This year, the State Secretary of Asylum and 
Migration went to Algeria as part of such a campaign.  
